[bradclark1]

@ Deep Six

[DeepSix]

[bradclark1]

[August]

Interesting article on the subject:

Washington Times
April 20, 2006
Pg. 21

The Rumsfeld Detractors

What do the generals' service records say?

By Stephen E. Herbits

Where is the rest of the story on the recent attacks on Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld by a few in the retired military? The news media will better meet its obligations to the public when it seeks more depth of experience and information about these generals-turned-Rumsfeld critics.

Having had the privilege of participating in Defense Department transitions now for four presidents, with my own experience in military affairs going back to 1967, I can offer such information.

The first observation to be made is that now that these generals have stepped out of their uniforms to make a personal and conscious entry into the political arena by calling for the resignation of a Cabinet official, they are opening their own records and their own performance -- perhaps even their own motivations -- to public scrutiny. This is not only fair game for the media, but absolutely essential for a public seeking to understand the full debate.

My experience points to several relevant issues -- some of which I personally know apply to some of those making the attacks.

First, while Mr. Rumsfeld has worked within the long tradition of civilian control of the military to modernize and strengthen the promotion and assignment system for senior uniformed officers, there are some who have actively tried to obstruct his efforts and could be acting as an extension of that opposition. For instance, within weeks of Mr. Rumsfeld's arrival in 2001, eight nominations -- two from each service -- were sent to the new secretary for one of the nine top senior military officers in command positions.

Upon examination, however, a simple fact leapt off the pages. The secretary had really been given one selection and seven non-comparable alternates, who, if not less qualified, were clearly less preferable than the one. When it happened a second time, the secretary instituted a new process. This new process has been in place for nearly five years and has required significantly more scrutiny, vetting and long-term planning.

Over that time, many generals who might have been promoted under the old system did not make it in the new one. The most telling indicator here is that of the top 40 senior military positions today, the Army now holds the fewest joint positions in its history. For too many years, the Army had simply not produced the needed talent for such critical positions. The effects of such cronyism had taken its toll. Mr. Rumsfeld's changes corrected that problem; they also provoked the resentment of some top Army brass.

There are a group of Army officers who adamantly oppose change, modernization, rationalization, transformation or whatever one wants to call the move to create a military for the future rather than a battery of tank divisions for the past. Many of these former officers stick together on retirement. They obtain the highest-level briefings from the active Army and offer their opinions, if not more, on everything from weapons to promotions. The Army can gain greatly from their experience, of course. But this clique is effectively a powerful, hidden informal force outside the Defense Department structure and outside the national political system.

There is at least one of the attackers who was passed over for promotion because of personal behavior which did not clear a routine morals examination. Not a problem; that is why top officers are vetted at each promotion and eachassignment.But shouldn't the public be permitted to know this information about those attacking the civilians in charge so that they may better judge the reasons behind the reasons?

Finally, there is the style issue. Anyone who has worked closely with this secretary will tell you that he is tough. What do they mean? He acts like a prosecutor. It is often said that you had better not present policy options to this secretary if you are not thoroughly prepared. I was held to the same standard -- and it is the right one.

There is no way the secretary can be an expert on every single issue that comes before him. But he can ask questions and he can drive down into the facts and analyses as few others can. It is through that process that he gains confidence in those making the recommendations so he can put his stamp on them. Or the opposite. Some interpret the tough sessions as personally affronting. Others, such as I, believe it is in the best service of this country.

It will also be a service to this country when the media digs a bit below these attacks to examine the generals who wish to play a political role in our civilian society. The public can then understand who is making the attacks and why. Arguably, such an understanding is helpful in any public debate. It is inarguably essential in this one.

Stephen E. Herbits has served five presidents as a military affairs adviser since 1967, including the Defense Department transition in 2001 and post-September 11 reforms.

[Sea Demon]

[Ducimus]

Personally, with a couple exceptions, i feel generals in the modern military stopped being general's years ago.

[bradclark1]

[Ducimus]

Politics.

[bradclark1]

Thats been since god made generals.
Ask Ike. Sometimes the germans were the least of his problems.

[August]

[DeepSix]

[August]

Washington Post
April 21, 2006
Pg. 23

The Generals' Dangerous Whispers

By Charles Krauthammer

Last time around, the antiwar left did not have a very high opinion of generals. A popular slogan in the 1960s was "war is too important to be left to the generals." It was the generals who had advocated attacking Cuba during the missile crisis of October 1962, while the civilians preferred -- and got -- a diplomatic solution. In popular culture, "Dr. Strangelove" made indelible the caricature of the war-crazed general. And it was I-know-better generals who took over the U.S. government in a coup in the 1960s bestseller and movie "Seven Days in May."

Another war, another take. I-know-better generals are back. Six of them, retired, are denouncing the Bush administration and calling for Donald Rumsfeld's resignation as secretary of defense. The antiwar types think this is just swell.

I don't. There are three possible complaints that the military brass could have against a secretary of defense. The first is that he doesn't listen to or consult military advisers. The six generals make that charge, but it is thoroughly disproved by the two men who were closer to Rumsfeld day to day, week in, week out than any of the accusing generals: former Joint Chiefs chairman Richard Myers and retired Marine Lt. Gen. Michael DeLong. Both attest to Rumsfeld's continual consultation and give-and-take with the military.

A second complaint is that the defense secretary disregards settled, consensual military advice. The military brass recommends X and SecDef willfully chooses Y. That in itself is not necessarily a bad thing. Rumsfeld's crusade to "transform" a Cold War-era military into a fast and lean fighting force has met tremendous resistance within the Pentagon. His canceling several heavy weapons systems, such as the monstrous Crusader artillery program, was the necessary overriding of a hidebound bureaucracy by an innovating civilian on a mission.

In his most recent broadside, retired Army Maj. Gen. John Batiste accuses the administration of "radically alter[ing] the results of 12 years of deliberate and continuous war planning" on Iraq. Well, the Bush administration threw out years and years and layer upon layer of war planning on Afghanistan, improvised one of the leanest possible attack plans and achieved one of the more remarkable military victories in recent history. There's nothing sacred about on-the-shelf war plans.

As for Iraq, it is hardly as if the military was of a single opinion on the critical questions of de-Baathification, disbanding Saddam Hussein's army or optimal coalition troop levels. There were divisions of opinion within the military as there were among the civilians and, indeed, among the best military experts in the country. Rumsfeld chose among the different camps. That's what defense secretaries are supposed to do.

What's left of the generals' revolt? A third complaint: He didn't listen to me . So what? Lincoln didn't listen to McClellan, and fired him. Truman had enough of listening to MacArthur and fired him, too. In our system of government, civilians fire generals, not the other way around.

Some of the complainers were on active duty when these decisions were made. If they felt so strongly about Rumsfeld's disregard of their advice, why didn't they resign at the time? Why did they wait to do so from the safety of retirement, with their pensions secured?

The Defense Department waves away the protesting generals as just a handful out of more than 8,000 now serving or retired. That seems to me too dismissive. These generals are no doubt correct in asserting that they have spoken to and speak on behalf of some retired and, even more important, some active-duty members of the military.

But that makes the generals' revolt all the more egregious. The civilian leadership of the Pentagon is decided on Election Day, not by the secret whispering of generals.

We've always had discontented officers in every war and in every period of our history. But they rarely coalesce into factions. That happens in places such as Hussein's Iraq, Pinochet's Chile or your run-of-the-mill banana republic. And when it does, outsiders (including the United States) do their best to exploit it, seeking out the dissident factions to either stage a coup or force the government to change policy.

That kind of dissident party within the military is alien to America. Some other retired generals have found it necessary to rise to the defense of the administration. Will the rest of the generals, retired or serving, now have to declare which camp they belong to?

It is precisely this kind of division that our tradition of military deference to democratically elected civilian superiors was meant to prevent. Today it suits the antiwar left to applaud the rupture of that tradition. But it is a disturbing and very dangerous precedent that even the left will one day regret.

[bradclark1]

First let me make something clear. I don't know if the generals are right or wrong in their thinking. I was/am backing them in that if they think something is wrong and they felt strongly enough about it and they had the courage to speak up.........

[bradclark1]

[Ducimus]